Fixed Budgets as a Cost Containment Measure for Pharmaceuticals by Granlund, David et al.
Fixed Budgets as a Cost Containment
Measure for Pharmaceuticals






In the county of Västerbotten, Sweden, there are two health cen-
tres which (contrary to all other health centers in the region) have a
strict responsibility over their pharmaceutical budget. The purpose
of this paper is to examine if the prices and quantities of pharma-
ceuticals prescribed by physicians working at these health centers dif-
fer signiﬁcantly from those prescribed by physicians at health centers
with open-ended budgets. Estimation results using matching meth-
ods, which allows us to compare similar patients at the diﬀerent health
centers, show that the introduction of ﬁxed pharmaceutical budgets
did not aﬀect physicians’ prescription behavior.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Sweden, there is an ongoing debate concerning the high cost for drugs.
In the last twenty-ﬁve years, the expenditures on drugs have risen with on
average 10 per cent per year and in 2002 the cost reached 31.7 billions SEK.
Prescription pharmaceuticals accounted for 24.5 billion, while hospital and
over-the-counter drugs accounted for 2.7 and 4.5 billion SEK, respectively.
The Swedish development parallels that of many other European countries,
w h i c hh a ss p u r r e da ni n t e r e s ti nd i ﬀerent methods to contain pharmaceu-
tical costs (see e.g. Dukes, 1993, Chapter 7 and Mossialos and Le Grand,
1999). Within the market for pharmaceuticals, cost containing measures
operate both on the pharmaceutical industry, e.g. price controls, and refer-
ence prices, and on the demand side, e.g. payment systems for physicians
and pharmacists, positive or negative lists suggesting which pharmaceuti-
cals physicians should prescribe, generic substitution requirements, and/or
patient co-payment plans.
During the period under study in this paper, the most widely used form
of cost containment in Sweden was patient co-payments. In Sweden, the
pharmaceutical insurance system is non-linear, making patient co-payments
decrease as total expenditure for pharmaceuticals increase. All costs for the
patient exceeding 1800 SEK per year are ﬁnanced through the Swedish phar-
maceuticals insurance system. Another well known cost containment mea-
sure is the so called reference price system which was introduced in Sweden in
1993. The reference price system stated that all costs above a predetermined
reference price had to be borne by the patient. Similar systems have also
been introduced in the Netherlands, Finland, Norway and Germany, among
other countries. The Swedish system speciﬁed that any costs exceeding the
price of the least expensive generic substitute by more than 10 per cent had
to be borne by the patient. On October 1, 2002, the reference price system in
Sweden was abolished. Instead a law (SFS 2002:160) was introduced, requir-
ing pharmacists to substitute the prescribed pharmaceutical to the cheapest
equivalent pharmaceutical product available at the local pharmacy.2
Exclusions of pharmaceuticals from the pharmaceutical reimbursement
plan have on occasion been used in Sweden. In the dataset used in this study,
approximately 2.2 per cent of all prescriptions relates to pharmaceuticals ex-
cluded from the reimbursement plan. Another possible cost containment
measure is to restrict the number of diagnoses for which a pharmaceutical
product can be prescribed. This has, however, been seen by policy makers as
to much of a restriction on physician autonomy, a concept central in medi-
cine (Dukes 1993, p. 138). Note also that under the Swedish pharmaceutical
insurance system there are usually no formal restrictions on physician pre-
scription behavior or pecuniary incentives for the physician to internalize a
proportion of the insurers utility.
Since 1998, the Swedish county councils are responsible for the costs of
prescription pharmaceuticals which is not paid by the patient. It is thus in
the interest of the county council to contain drug costs. In spite of this, health
centers located in Västerbotten, which are the main source of pharmaceutical
prescriptions made in the region, usually work with open-ended budgets for
pharmaceutical expenditure, meaning that the prescribing agency has little
incentive to contain costs.
The purpose of the present paper is to study the eﬀects of an attempt
by the local county council to introduce ’hard’ budget constraints in phar-
maceutical budgets in two of the health centers in Västerbotten, Sweden. In
2001, these two health centers were given ﬁxed budgets for pharmaceutical
expenditures, giving them an incentive to decrease expenditures as they were
a l l o w e dt ok e e pa n ys u r p l u s( a n db e i n gf o r c e dt or e p a ya n yd e ﬁcit) generated
during the year.
W h e t h e ro rn o ti n t r o d u c i n gﬁxed budgets will help contain costs in public
agencies is, however, an open question. On the one hand, ﬁxed budget con-
straints are often considered a necessary condition for the budgetary process
to be eﬀective. On the other hand, ﬁxed budget constraints are seldom seen
as suﬃcient cost containing measures in public agencies. One problem is that
ﬁxed budgets must be credible. The principal may be tempted to adjust bud-3
gets according to history, creating an incentive to overspend in order not to
get future budget cuts, the so called ratchet eﬀect (see Kornai et al 2003
for a discussion of soft budget constraints). Another problem is that lack of
information may render the principal to introduce more or less fuzzy con-
tracts, making incentives unclear (see e.g. Prendergast, 1999, for a lengthier
discussion of problems associated with optimal incentive contracts). Thus,
the eﬃcacy of introducing hard budget constraints on cost containment is an
empirical question.
This paper contributes to the literature on cost containment in health
care by comparing pharmaceutical expenditure at health centers with ﬁxed
pharmaceutical budgets to those with open-ended budgets. Changes in the
expenditures on pharmaceuticals are decomposed into three parts; the num-
ber of prescriptions, the size of prescriptions (the number of deﬁned daily
doses per prescription), and the price of the pharmaceutical. Prescriptions
are matched according to a large number of background variables, includ-
ing age and diagnosis, using the method of propensity score matching. This
makes it possible to study if physicians respond to the budgetary rules by
prescribing cheaper medicine or fewer doses of medicine per prescription. Fi-
nally, the number of prescriptions in health centers with ﬁxed budgets are
compared to those with open-ended budgets.
The results show that the number of prescriptions in the two health cen-
ters with ﬁxed budgets declined relative to the control group after the in-
troduction of the ﬁxed budgets. However, there is no systematic diﬀerence
regarding either price or quantity per prescription between the two types of
health centers. A possible explanation is that the prescribing physicians do
not believe the ﬁxed budgets to be credible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the main
hypotheses to be explored in this paper. Section 3 presents the empirical
analysis. The data to be used are presented in subsection 3.1. Subsection
3.2 describes the matching method to be used, while subsections 3.3 and
3.4 contain the results from the propensity score estimations and from the4
matching, respectively. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Background and hypotheses to be explored
As mentioned, the purpose of this paper is to study if diﬀerences in budgetary
rules among health centers in Sweden aﬀect physicians’ prescription behavior.
From 1998, the county councils in Sweden are responsible for the costs of
prescription pharmaceuticals which are not paid by the patient. For the
county council in Västerbotten, these costs are approximately 500 million
SEK per year. The county councils are to some extent reimbursed by the
central government through the Swedish National Insurance Board (SNIB).
An agreement between the local county council in Västerbotten and the
SNIB states that during the years 2000 to 2004, the SNIB will pay a total of
1.5 billion SEK for pharmaceutical insurance costs in Västerbotten, Sweden.
This means that approximately 375 million SEK per year is paid by the
SNIB, while all additional costs for pharmaceutical insurance is paid by the
local county council in Västerbotten.
In the county of Västerbotten, health centers have since 2001 budgetary
responsibility for pharmaceutical costs. The county council works with target
budgets for the health centers, which are decided partly upon on the basis
of population characteristics, primary age and gender, within each health
center’s reception area and partly upon each health center’s result in 2001.
However, budgets are not ﬁxed in the sense that surpluses or deﬁcits are car-
ried over to the next year’s budget. This means that the economic incentives
to reduce drug costs are limited.
Starting in 2001, two health centers located in Västerbotten (Burträsk
and Moröbacke health centers) obtained ﬁxed budgets as a part of an agree-
ment intended to increase the centers’ self-autonomy. A ﬁxed budget is here
deﬁned as a budget that is determined on the basis of characteristics which
are exogenous to the decisions made by the health center, and where sur-
pluses and deﬁcits carry over to the next year’s budget.5
There are several ways by which an introduction of ﬁxed budgets may
aﬀect prescription behavior in health centers. First, the amount of prescrip-
tions made out can be decreased. Having a ﬁxed budget reasonably means
that physicians will be more reluctant of writing prescriptions at given prices
and quantities. Second, since marginal co-payment decreases with the total
purchase of medicine during a full year, physicians can ’choose’ to change the
mix of patients who obtain prescription drugs. In order to engage in patient
substitution, a physician must have information regarding the position of the
patient in the price schedule. Such information has not been available during
the period of our study.
Third, the price of medicine for a given treatment can be decreased by,
for example, an increased use of generic drugs. Availability of information
regarding the price of diﬀerent pharmaceuticals has increased during the
period under study. Finally, prescriptions can be made to reduce the number
of deﬁned daily doses (DDD:s) per prescription. A well known problem with
prescription pharmaceuticals is that large amounts of the pharmaceuticals are
wasted, indicating that a major problem is overprescribing. However, note
also that if the number of doses is reduced, there is an increased likelihood
that the patient returns to the health center for a new prescription, which
may increase costs. In the present paper, we address the two last channels, i.e.
if the introduction of a ﬁxed budget decreases prices for drugs within speciﬁc
ATC-groups, and if the number of doses per prescription is aﬀected. We
also include some tentative information on the total number of prescriptions
m a d eo u ta tt h ed i ﬀerent health centers.
In order to study the price and quantity eﬀects, a comparison is made
between the two health centers with ﬁxed budgets (the treatment group) to
a group of health centers which have target budgets (the comparison group).
Since prescription behavior can diﬀer before the introduction of ﬁxed budgets,
a time dimension is also included. A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method is used
to study price and quantity eﬀects. If ﬁxed budgets have the intended eﬀects,
we expect the prices and/or number of DDD:s to drop in the treatment group6
relative to the comparison group.
Finally, on October 1, 2002, the so called substitution reform was intro-
duced, requiring pharmacists to substitute the prescribed pharmaceutical to
the cheapest equivalent pharmaceutical product available at the local phar-
macy. This reform has had a large eﬀect on drug costs, in particular prices,
in health centers (Socialstyrelsen 2003, p. 15). The substitution reform of-
fers another possibility to test our hypotheses. Since the introduction of
ﬁxed budgets was made in 2001, prices and quantities should already have
d r o p p e di nt h eh e a l t hc e n t e r sw i t hﬁxed budgets before the introduction of
the substitution reform. Therefore, making a similar comparison before and
after the introduction of the substitution reform, we would expect a price
decrease in the comparison group relative to the group of ’treated’ health
centers.
To summarize, our main hypotheses are as follows: (i) comparing the
period January to September 2002, when ﬁxed budgets are newly introduced,
with the pre-reform period, we expect prices and quantities in treated health
centers to fall relative to the comparisons; and (ii) for the period after the
introduction of the substitution reform, we expect the relative price diﬀerence
to be positive. A potential problem with the data is that the year 2001,
which forms the basis for our ﬁrst comparison, is an adjustment period for
the health centers where ﬁxed budgets are to be introduced. This means
that the treated health centers may have acted so as to increase their future
budgets. In order to at least shed some light on whether such behavior might
have inﬂuenced our data, we also compare post and pre-reform periods in the
year 2001.7
3 The empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The data used in this study has been provided by the county council of
Västerbotten, Sweden. It contains a total of 6.2 million observation, covering
all pharmaceuticals sold in the county of Västerbotten or sold in other parts
of Sweden to residents of Västerbotten between January 2001 and June 2003.
From this population a random sample of twenty-ﬁve per cent is drawn.
The county of Västerbotten (population 255 122, June 2003) consists of
ﬁfteen administrative areas. The two health centres Burträsk and Moröbacke,
w h i c hb o t ha r el o c a t e di nt h ea d m i n i s t r a t i v ea r e ao fS k e l l e f t e å ,r e c e i v e dﬁxed
budgets for prescription pharmaceuticals on May 1, 2001, and November 1,
2001, respectively. Since these are the two health centres of interest in this
paper and since we want to avoid potential diﬀerences between the areas to
inﬂuence the results, all observations not originating from physicians work-
ing at health centres in Skellefteå are excluded. In this step, we also exclude
nearly six per cent of the observations lacking information about the physi-
cian’s workplace. In addition, nearly six per cent of the observations are
dropped since the cost per DDD can not be calculated or because they indi-
cate resell of the pharmaceutical product to the pharmacy. The ﬁnal sample
to be used in the empirical analysis consists of 292 419 observations.
The dataset includes information regarding the patients age, gender and
area of residency. Patients are however not traceable over time. The infor-
mation about the prescription contains the month in which it is sold, the
pharmaceuticals ATC-code and an indicator if the pharmaceutical is packed
in patient-doses rather than their ordinary packages. Patients who have rel-
atively stable medication and can be expected to have some problem keeping
track of how big doses they should take, often receives their prescriptions in
patient-doses. In addition, the dataset includes information about the cost
of the prescription as well as the patient’s co-payment for the prescription.
Using these variables and information about the diﬀerent phases in the re-8
imbursement system, we have calculated the co-payment bracket in which
the patient was prior to paying for the current prescription. The calculations
have been left out in order to save space, but are available from the authors
upon request. The dummy variables Copay100, Copay50, Copay25, Copay10
and Copay0 are deﬁned so as to correspond to marginal rates of co-payment
of 100, 50, 25, 10 and 0 per cent, respectively. Some prescriptions are always
free of charge for the patient and others are excluded from the reimbursement
plan (for example cough medicine), irrespective of the patient’s co-payment
bracket. For these observations the patients’ co-payment rates bear no in-
formation of previous cost for prescription pharmaceuticals. The dummy
variables Free and Unsub indicate that a prescription is free of charge and
unsubsidized, respectively.
Descriptive statistics by health centres are presented in Table 1. For the
diﬀerent indicator variables the percentage of the material which belongs
to each category are presented. For continuous variables the means and
standard deviations are presented instead.9
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by health centres
Variable Category Sample Control Burträsk Moröbacke
Gender Female 65.40 65.76 63.39 64.44
Male 34.60 34.24 36.61 35.56
Area of Skellefteå 99.30 99.32 99.04 99.33
residency Other area 0.70 0.68 0.96 0.67
Patient- Yes 48.73 48.53 45.11 52.6
doses No 51.27 51.47 54.89 47.4
Patient’s Copay100 29.33 28.72 34.53 29.71
Payment Copay50 14.10 14.02 15.48 13.65
Copay25 12.65 12.71 12.83 12.1
Copay10 11.07 11.18 10.06 11.01
Copay0 29.89 30.57 24.35 29.98
Unsub 2.19 2.09 2.08 2.93
Free 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.61
Variable
Age Mean 71.07 71.64 72.51 66.26
Std. dv. 18.76 18.49 17.07 20.89
Price/DDD Mean 6.49 6.46 5.68 7.22
Std. dv. 19.21 19.83 13.46 18.43
DDD:s/prescr. Mean 41.67 41.91 44.91 37.76
Std. dv. 56.24 56.17 58.08 55.20
Cost/prescr. Mean 162.96 164.46 155.23 158.43
Std. dv. 286.51 284.27 308.82 284.90
NOBS. 292 419 232 799 24 622 34 998
The data contains 146 four-digit ATC-groups. Of these groups 52 have
less than 100 observations, 39 have between 100 and 1 000 observations,
55 have more than 1 000 observations. The observations are quite evenly
distributed between the thirty months included in the study, with fewest
pharmaceuticals (7 830) sold in June 2002 and most pharmaceuticals (11
178) sold in October 2002.10
Descriptive statistics of the key-variables of interest both prior to and
after the introduction of ﬁxed budget constraints are presented in Table 2 be-
low. Table 2 show that the Price/DDD and the number of DDD:s/prescription
have been reduced for Burträsk after ﬁxed budgets were introduced. The op-
posite is true for Moröbacke, but the number of prescriptions per month have
decreased for Moröbacke. For the entire sample the average cost per DDD is
6.5 SEK, the average number of DDD:s per prescription equals 41.7 and the
average cost per prescription is 163 SEK.11
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups
Pre treat. Burträsk Pre treat. Moröbacke
Variable Burträsk Control Moröbacke Control
Price/DDD Mean 6.24 6.24 7.01 6.21
Std. dv. 13.46 13.36 16.69 21.25
DDD:s/prescr. Mean 46.42 41.38 35.94 41.47
Std. dv. 63.10 55.97 51.87 56.10
Cost/prescr. Mean 171.07 160.13 151.28 159.69
Std. dv. 307.60 276.96 268.96 273.78
NOBS. 3 217 29 817 11 948 75 586
Prescr./month1 3 378.25 30 330.50 4 804.30 30 943.50
Post treat. Burträsk Post treat. Moröbacke
Variable Burträsk Control Moröbacke Control
Price/DDD Mean 5.59 6.50 7.33 6.58
Std. dv. 13.46 20.61 19.27 19.11
DDD:s/prescr. Mean 44.68 41.99 38.71 42.12
Std. dv. 57.29 56.20 56.83 56.20
Cost/prescr. Mean 152.85 165.10 162.14 166.75
Std. dv. 308.94 285.32 292.76 289.14
NOBS. 21 405 202 982 23 050 157 213
Prescr./month1 3 317.31 31 764.15 4 595.65 31 887.75
1Prescr./month refer to the average numbers of prescriptions per month for the whole
population and no standard deviations are therefore reported.
3.2 Econometric Method
To test whether the average price per DDD and the average number of DDD:s
per prescription are aﬀected by the introduction of ﬁxed budgets, we would
like to estimate the average treatment eﬀect on the treated for these two
outcome variables. Treated in this case means that the prescription is written
b yap h y s i c i a nw o r k i n ga tah e a l t hc e n t e rw i t hﬁxed pharmaceutical budget.12
When evaluating the average treatment eﬀect on the treated, we can view
the problem as if there for every observation, at every time, are two possible
outcomes, labelled 1 if the observation is treated, and 0 if the observation
is untreated. We can only observe one outcome for each observation at each
time. The average treatment eﬀect on the treated could be expressed as:
(1 − 0| =1 )=(1| =1 )− (0| =1 )
where  is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the observation actually
is treated and the term (0| =1 )is unobservable. That is, we cannot
observe what the outcome would have been for the treated, if they had not
been treated. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that if this term is
estimated with the outcome for the untreated we get a bias which can be
written as
 = (0| =1 )− (0| =0 )
Both the OLS and the matching method deal with this bias problem by
adjusting for a set of observable variables, X, which are diﬀerently distributed
in the groups and can inﬂuence the outcome. One advantage of the matching
method is that it is semiparametric and therefore avoids the functional form
restrictions of the OLS equation.
In this study, a variant of propensity score matching will be used, in which
untreated observations are determined to be suitable matches for treated
observations if they have similar probability of being treated. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) prove that if the following three conditions are satisﬁed,
when the outcome is independent of treatment assignment conditioned on
the propensity score, 	( =1 |
) and the bias is zero. The ﬁrst condition
is that all relevant diﬀerences between the groups have to be captured by
their observables X. The second condition states that the matching must be
done over a region where the probability of being treated conditioned on X
is between zero and one, that is:
0 	 ( =1 |
)  113
As shown by Smith and Todd (2003a) the condition 0  	 ( =1 |
) is
not required when the parameter of interest is the average treatment eﬀect
on the treated, since it only guarantees good matches for each untreated
observation. The ﬁnal condition is that the observables must be independent
of treatment assignment conditioned on the propensity score.
By using both pre- and post-treatment data we avoid having to fulﬁll
the ﬁrst condition. We do this by using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence extension
of propensity score matching which can take account of time-invariant un-
observable heterogeneity. This method makes it possible to get a unbiased
estimate of the treatment eﬀe c to nt h et r e a t e de v e ni fu n o b s e r v a b l ed i ﬀerences
exists between Burträsk and Moröbacke and other health centers, as long as
these diﬀerences are time-invariant. We estimate the diﬀerences between the
treated-control outcome diﬀerences after treatment and the treated-control
outcome diﬀerences before treatment, that is:
∆

=1 =[ (1| =1 )− (0| =1 ) ]− [(
 
1|
  =1 )− (
 
0|
  =1 ) ]
where   indicates the period before treatment and   is a dummy which takes
the value one for observations originating from Burträsk or Moröbacke before
they received ﬁxed budgets for prescription pharmaceutical. The eﬀect will
be estimated separately for Burträsk and Moröbacke since they received ﬁxed
pharmaceutical budgets at diﬀerent times.
Matching methods diﬀer by placing diﬀerent weights on the control ob-
servations. Nearest neighbor matching, which will be used in this paper, puts
all weight on the observation in the non-treated group which has the most
similar propensity score. This reduces bias since only the best matches are
used, but could lead to increased variance compared to the other matching
methods which uses more observations from the control group. We impose
a common support condition by specifying that the maximum allowed dis-
tance between the propensity score of the treated and the control is 0.01.
Treated observations for which no matches can be found within this caliper
are excluded from the analysis.14
3.3 Estimation of propensity score
The ﬁrst step in estimating the diﬀerence in diﬀerence is to estimate the
propensity scores before and after treatment. To be able to get robust esti-
m a t e sw ew a n tt ou s ev a r i a b l e sw h i c ha ﬀect treatment, as well as variables
which aﬀect the outcome, when estimating the propensity score. We include
gender, using an indicator variable equaling one if the individual is a female,
and age by using indicator variables for each ﬁve-year group. We also include
a dummy variable, denoted Area, which takes the value one if the patient’s
area of residency is some other than Skellefteå, and include indicator variables
for the month in which the pharmaceutical is sold.
As can be seen in Table 1, the share of the prescriptions made out in
patient-doses diﬀers between health centres. Coscelli (2000) has shown that
patients exhibit strong state dependence, that is, they prefer the drug they
have been prescribed before. This gives the usually more expensive brand-
name drug a ﬁrst mover advantage. The state dependence is probably more
important among the patients receiving their prescriptions in patient-doses,
since these patients usually have relatively stable medication. We therefore
include a dummy variable, referred to as Doses below, which takes the value
one if the prescription is made out in patient doses.
Previous studies have shown that the patient’s co-payment is likely to
aﬀect the prescription being made (see e.g. Lundin, 2002, and Rudholm,
2004). We include the dummy variables Copay, Unsub and Free to take
account of this eﬀect. We use the patient’s co-payment bracket prior to
receiving the prescription in question, to avoid the endogenity problem of co-
payment being aﬀected by the price and volume of the drug being prescribed.
Another variable which is important to include is the four digit ATC-
groups of the pharmaceuticals. The ATC-group aﬀects treatment as the
health centers have physicians with diﬀerent specialities, and aﬀects out-
come since average price per DDD and number of DDD:s per prescription
vary considerable between ATC-groups. We view ATC-group as a predeter-
mined health indicator which is a function of the patient’s health status and15
therefore exogenous of treatment. The same argument goes for Doses, Unsub
and Free.
Among a general set of models, all including the variables discussed above
but including diﬀerent interaction terms, the ﬁnal speciﬁcations are chosen
to maximize the within-sample correct prediction rates using the hit-or-miss
method (e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). This method ascribes
observations a ”1” if the estimated propensity score is larger than the portion
of the sample which is treated and a ”0” otherwise. The propensity scores
have been calculated using logit estimations of versions of the following equa-
tion;

	  = 0 + 1	 +
−1 [
=1
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where 
	 equals one if the prescription is made out by a physician at
Burträsk or Moröbacke and  and  indicate the number of age-groups,
months and four digit ATC-groups in each subsample, respectively.
The results from the logit estimations (available from the authors upon
request) show that all models are signiﬁcant at the 0.0001 level, according
to a F-tests made. The within-sample correct prediction rate range between
56 and 62 per cent for the models referring to Burträsk and between 5816
and 65 per cent for those referring to Moröbacke. The corresponding ﬁgures
for the pseudo R2 values are two to six per cent and two to nine per cent,
respectively.
Two balancing tests presented in Appendix 1 show that we have been
able to balance most subsamples by matching on propensity score. How-
ever, for all models some variables remain unbalanced. Descriptive statistics
for the model which is least balanced, reported in Table A2, indicates that
the remaining bias due to observables is small in magnitude also for this
subsample.
3.4 Matching Results
As discussed in section 2, we expect the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates to
be non constant over time. We will therefore divide the data into sub peri-
ods in order to test the hypotheses that prices and quantities are aﬀected by
the introduction of ﬁxed budgets. Three post-treatment periods are identi-
ﬁed. First, for the period 2002 and after, the treated health centers had an
incentive to decrease prices and quantities. However, on October 1, 2002,
the substitution reform was introduced, which may have had a large impact
on health centers which prescribed relatively expensive medicine. If ﬁxed
budgets had an impact on prices and quantities, we would most likely ﬁnd
ad i ﬀerence in prices and quantities for the period up to the substitution re-
form. Therefore, the ﬁrst comparison is made between the period January to
September 2002 and the period 2001 prior to the introduction of ﬁxed bud-
gets. Second, after October 1, 2002, when the substitution reform is enforced,
we expect the prices in the comparison group to be aﬀected more strongly
than those in the treated health centers, since, if ﬁxed budgets had the hy-
pothesized eﬀects, prices should already have adjusted in the treated health
centers. Third, the ﬁxed pharmaceutical budgets are in part determined
by outcomes in 2001, which gives the treated health centers an incentive to
overspend in 2001 in order to increase their future budgets. We therefore
compare the period 2001 after the formal introduction of the new rules with17
the period 2001 prior to the introduction of ﬁxed budgets (January to April
for Burträsk and January to October for Moröbacke) in order to study if this
incentive led to changes in prescription behavior.
Of the prescriptions made out by physicians at Burträsk and Moröbacke,
2.7 and 4.9 per cent respectively, are made out to patients not listed at the re-
spective health centres, which means that they do not have to bear the costs
for these prescription. Neither are the health centers budgets charged for
the 0.6 per cent of the observations which refers to special pharmaceuticals.
The results to be presented are not aﬀected when dropping these observa-
tions and the observations which refer to unsubsidized pharmaceuticals. The
results are also robust against small changes in the speciﬁcation of the se-
lection models. In order to investigate if the introduction of ﬁxed budgets
and/or the substitution reform had diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent pharmaceu-
tical treatments, we also distinguish between ATC-groups. The three groups
chosen are A, C and N, which refer to drugs related to digestive organs and
metabolism, heart and circulation, and the nervous system, respectively. The
groups constitute approximately 12, 24 and 28 per cent of the prescriptions,
respectively.
Let us start by comparing the period January to September 2002 with
the period prior to treatment. The average treatment eﬀects on the treated
of introducing ﬁxed budgets for this period are presented in Table 3. As
m e n t i o n e di no u rﬁrst hypotheses in section 2, we expect both prices and
quantities to decrease relative to the comparison group. However, the es-
timated quantity diﬀerence for Moröbacke is positive and signiﬁcant when
comparing all ATC-groups, and there is a large variation in the estimated
quantity diﬀerences between ATC-groups. For Burträsk, one can note that
the price diﬀerence is positive and signiﬁcant in ATC-group N, the other
estimated diﬀerences vary in size as well as sign.18
Table 3. Estimation results, Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence, Hypothesis 1
Burträsk Moröbacke
Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres. Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres.
Sample 0.05 -1.76 -0.61 3.57*
(0.37) (1.99) (0.46) (1.27)
ATC-group A -0.79 1.37 -1.11 -2.74
(0.91) (3.72) (0.64) (3.44)
ATC-group C 0.30 -0.56 1.24 -0.22
(0.50) (2.63) (0.94) (3.15)
ATC-group N 1.68* -2.95 -0.85 1.52
(0.64) (1.92) (0.55) (0.99)
* indicates that the estimate are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve per cent
signiﬁcant level.
1The number of bootstrap repetitions used to calculate the conﬁdence interval is 50.
2 In the subsamples referring to Burträsk and in the subsamples referring to
ATC-group C or N for Moröbacke 1 to 10 observations are not used in the
estimation since they are of common support. The corresponding ﬁgures for the
other subsamples in Moröbacke is 26 to 49.
In order to test our second hypotheses, we take the diﬀerences between
the period September 2002 and after, and January to September 2002. These
results are presented in Table 4. Burträsk and Moröbacke has lowered the
number of DDD:s/prescription after the substitution reform relative to the
control group, but prices per DDD are largely unaﬀected. This is surprising
since the reform is aimed to aﬀect price per DDD but not the number of
DDD:s.19
Table 4. Estimation results, Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence, Hypothesis 2
Burträsk Moröbacke
Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres. Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres.
Sample 0.15 -3.11* -0.08 -3.55*
(0.33) (1.57) (0.48) (1.41)
ATC-group A -0.21 -8.36* 0.90 8.35*
(1.02) (4.01) (0.69) (3.96)
ATC-group C -0.27 -5.73* -1.67 3.13
(0.63) (2.73) (1.24) (4.00)
ATC-group N -0.91 0.46 0.00 -0.79
(0.89) (1.31) (0.55) (0.95)
See notes in Table 3.
As discussed previously, a potential problem when testing our ﬁrst hy-
potheses is that the price and quantities in the year 2001 could be aﬀected
by an attempt of the treated health centres to increase their future budgets.
An increase in price and quantities relative to the comparison group, when
comparing the post and pre-reform periods in the year 2001, would indicate
that such behavior might have inﬂuenced our data. The results presented in
Table 5 show that quantities are signiﬁcantly increased in Moröbacke when
comparing over all the ATC-groups, and there is a general tendency of pos-
itive eﬀects also within ATC-groups. For Burträsk, quantity diﬀerences are
generally negative, although insigniﬁcant. There is no systematic diﬀerences
in prices between the groups. Again, signiﬁcant results are found within
ATC-group N. Even though the results for quantities in Moröbacke have the
expected sign, no systematic diﬀerence in prescription behavior can be ob-
served when comparing the post and pre-reform periods in the year 2001.
This is however a weak test of strategic behavior since such behavior could
have started before the formal introduction of the new rules. If the results
for the ﬁrst hypotheses are aﬀected by strategic behavior, this would lead to
an overestimation of potential reductions in price and quantities due to the
introduction of ﬁxed pharmaceutical budgets. To conclude, independent of20
comparison, only a few of the estimated eﬀects turns out in favour of our
hypotheses. Most of the estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Often, signiﬁcant estimates are contrary to expectations. Thus, the data
display no support for the hypothesis that ﬁxed budgets aﬀect physician
prescription behavior.
Table 5. Estimation results, Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence, 2001
Burträsk Moröbacke
Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres. Price/DDD DDD:s/Pres.
Sample 0.38 -4.25 -0.55 5.32*
(0.46) (2.19) (0.72) (1.58)
ATC-group A -0.65 -1.16 -0.08 4.68
(0.50) (4.25) (0.75) (5.98)
ATC-group C -0.01 -4.13 0.11 3.37
(0.57) (2.67) (1.42) (4.34)
ATC-group N 1.74* -3.66 -2.12* 0.92
(0.70) (2.07) (0.85) (1.97)
See notes in Table 3.
4 Discussion
Tentative results from this paper show that when health centers in Väster-
botten were given a ﬁxed budget, the number of prescriptions of pharmaceu-
tical products declined. This can be seen as an indication that the prescrib-
ing physicians adopted to the new budgetary rules by reducing the number
of prescriptions, as compared with the previous situation when they were
given open-ended budgets. Other possible explanations for this result in-
clude changes in the health status of the population using these two health
centers, or demographic factors in the community were the health centers are
located. However, the short time period under study makes such explana-
tions less probable, since health status and demographic factors are, in most
cases, relatively constant over short periods of time.21
The results also show that there are no systematic diﬀerences regarding
either price or quantity per prescription between health centers using ﬁxed
and open-ended budgets for pharmaceutical products, after controlling for
several confounding factors. One possible explanation is that the prescribing
physicians do not believe the ﬁxed budgets to be credible, in the sense that
they expect the county council to cover deﬁcits or to cut future budgets in
the case of surplus. Another possible explanation is that the new incentive
structure is not clear to the prescribing physicians, or that physicians believe
that any surplus generated could be used in ways that they dislike.
A potential problem is that introducing the new budgetary system with
ﬁxed budgets was voluntary for both the health centers and the local county
council. As such, the health centers which entered an agreement with the
county council to have ﬁxed pharmaceuticals budgets might be centers which
had low initial pharmaceutical expenditures. In addition, both of the health
centers which were given ﬁxed budgets are located in Skellefteå, a region
were several other cost containment measures, as for example recommended
lists, have been used. Such recommended lists often include not only which
pharmaceutical product to use, but also recommendations regarding the op-
timal package size to prescribe in order to avoid overprescribing. This could
mean that decreasing the pharmaceutical costs per prescription further, for
example by introducing ﬁxed budgets, might be diﬃcult. As such, the only
way to reduce pharmaceutical costs is to reduce the number of prescriptions
made, as observed in the two health centers which were given ﬁxed budgets.22
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Appendix 1. Balancing tests
As mentioned above, to guarantee that propensity score matching will elimi-
nate all the bias which the observables can account for, the observables must
be independent of the treatment assignment conditioned on the propensity
score. Several diﬀerent test of this condition are proposed in the literature.
The tests have diﬀerent limitations and little is known about their statistic
properties.
In this paper we employ two balancing tests. The ﬁrst is a Hotelling

 2 test of the joint null hypothesis of equal means between the treatment
groups and their control groups. This test can, however, fail to reject the
null hypothesis even if X is dependent of treatment assignment, conditioned
on the propensity score. One example of this could be if some variables
have higher values in the treated group, compared to the matched group,
for high values of the propensity score but lower values for low values of the
propensity score.
The second balancing test we conduct is a regression based test described
in Smith and Todd (2003b). For each variable used in estimating the propen-
sity score we estimate the following regression:

 = 0 + 1 ˆ (
)+2 ˆ (
)
2 + 3 ˆ (
)
3 + 4 ˆ (
)
4
+5 + 6 ˆ (
)+7 ˆ (
)
2 + 8 ˆ (
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3 + 9 ˆ (
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where  is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the ob-
s e r v a t i o ni st r e a t e d . I na na t t e m p tt ot e s tw h e t h e r provides additional
information about 
 conditioned on (
) we test the joint null hypothesis
that all the coeﬃcients of the terms involving  equal zero. A shortcoming
to this test is that the choice of the order of the polynomial may aﬀect the
result.24
Table A1. Results, Balancing Tests
Burträsk Moröbacke
H.T. R.T. H.T. R.T.
Sample, pre 1.00 0.15 0.09 0.24
ATC-group A, pre 1.00 0.12 0.75 0.31
ATC-group C, pre 1.00 0.29 0.92 0.22
ATC-group N, pre 1.00 0.18 0.02 0.33
Sample, 2001 post 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.20
ATC-group A, 2001 post 0.99 0.30 1.00 0.18
ATC-group C, 2001 post 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.10
ATC-group N, 2001 post 0.88 0.15 0.97 0.16
Sample, Jan.02-Sep.02 0.98 0.29 0.06 0.28
ATC-group A, Jan.02-Sep.02 0.95 0.21 1.00 0.26
ATC-group C, Jan.02-Sep.02 1.00 0.13 0.93 0.15
ATC-group N, Jan.02-Sep.02 0.75 0.30 0.04 0.19
Sample, Oct.02-June03 0.27 0.22 0.00 0.27
ATC-group A, Oct.02-June03 0.97 0.18 0.87 0.30
ATC-group C, Oct.02-June03 0.75 0.22 1.00 0.15
ATC-group N, Oct.02-June03 0.75 0.18 0.05 0.31
Note: The P-values are presented for the Hotelling test (H.T). For the
regression test (R.T.), the percentage of the variables which are
unbalanced on the ﬁve per cent signiﬁcant level are reported.
The results from the tests appear in Table A1. The Hotelling test reject
balance for three of the subsamples for Moröbacke. The results from the
regression based test show that between 10 and 33 per cent of the indepen-
dent variables remain unbalanced conditioned on the propensity score in all
models. According to the two test we have preformed, the subsamples for
ATC-group N, pre for Moröbacke is least balanced. We therefore include
descriptive statistics for this subsample in Table A2, which indicate that the
remaining bias is small in magnitude.25
Table A2. Descriptive statistics of Balancing
Controls
Variable Unmatched Matched Treated
Gender 68.83 67.82 67.60
Age 75.24 71.51 70.68
Area 0.31 0.15 0.17
Dozes 69.08 76.31 75.28
Copay50 14.66 12.86 14.14
Copay25 13.58 12.15 12.98
Copay10 13.10 11.27 12.35
Copay0 33.06 37.80 35.27
Unsub 0.29 0.27 0.32
ATC-group NO2A 14.01 12.44 12.05
ATC-group NO2B 21.03 21.70 18.75
ATC-group NO2C 1.90 1.35 1.42
ATC-group NO3A 5.07 4.93 6.90
ATC-group NO4A 1.08 1.08 1.40
ATC-group NO4B 3.02 1.40 1.79
ATC-group NO5A 7.73 7.54 9.30
ATC-group NO5B 4.39 4.37 4.86
ATC-group NO5C 19.58 21.04 18.90
ATC-group NO6A 20.53 22.90 23.32
ATC-group NO6D 1.57 1.20 1.13
ATC-group NO7A 0.04 0.02 0.02
ATC-group NO7B 0.06 0.02 0.15
AgeGender 52.87 49.74 49.00
Age2Gender 4217.79 3856.96 3768.68
GenderCopay50 10.46 8.39 9.33
GenderCopay25 9.30 8.32 8.81
GenderCopay10 9.11 7.76 8.79
GenderCopay0 22.79 25.43 23.02
GenderUnsub 0.16 0.25 0.2026
I nT a b l eA 2 ,t h em o n t hs p e c i ﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are left out in order to
save space. For the same reason, a continuous variable is reported for age
instead of the dummy variables. For the diﬀerent indicator variables the
percentage of the material which belongs to each category are presented and
for continuous variables the means are presented.